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INTRODUCTION
In dealing with protracted conflict, the main challenge stems from
understanding the motives of the parties: why they "would not recognize each
other, would not talk to each other, would not commit themselves to a
negotiated settlement, and would not negotiate."' This is further complicated
when each party feels that "right"--however defined-is on its side no matter
what claims exist to the contrary, even those embedded in international law.
Either side's stubborn insistence on the rightness of its point of view may
lead it to act in ways that circumvent internationally agreed upon resolutions,
and thus prolong the conflict and/or create an impasse.
In any conflict, a number of rules accepted and adhered to by both
protagonists must exist if the conflict is to be resolved, or a compromise
reached through negotiation.2 In most protracted conflicts, the players have
either not subscribed to such prerequisites or, in many instances, have not
fully acknowledged them. The issue is more intricate in situations where, for
reasons of pride and status, a party to the conflict feels that it has nothing to
gain from entering into negotiation.3 This same party may decide that its
"sovereignty," even if it is not recognized by anyone in the world-let alone
the other party-cannot be the subject of negotiation. History shows us,
however, that political leaders, even the most unyielding on the issue of
' Associate Professor of international studies at Thunderbird-The American
Graduate School
of International Management, in Arizona. Professor Zoubir is the co-author of INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT (1993), and the author of numerous articles
on the Maghreb.
1. Harold Saunders, We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of PrenegotiatingPhases, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 251 (1985).
2. A good discussion of this point can be found in RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS
CULTURES: COMMUNICATION OBSTACLES IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 8-11 (1991).

3. Id.at 11-14.
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negotiating with the "rebels," the "secessionists," or the "puppets," end up
doing just that; French President Charles de Gaulle finally sat down with the
Algerian FLN, as did the Israelis with the PLO. The key to understanding
this process, therefore, is to comprehend the factors that "trigger" prenegotiation. A partial explanation is found in the definition of prenegotiation
given by one of its proponents:
Prenegotiation begins when one or more parties considers negotiation as a
policy option and communicates this intention to other parties. It ends
when the parties agree to formal negotiations . . . or when one party
abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option. ... In essential
terms, prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which the parties
move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual problem to a joint
search for cooperative multilateral or joint solutions.'
Despite its numerous merits, this definition is too inclusive, thereby reducing
its analytic focus. What of mere contacts between conflicting parties? Do
these constitute prenegotiation? What if the contact is merely a maneuver to
content international public opinion or to set the stage for confidence-building
with the "patron" at the expense of the "client" of one of the two parties
involved in the conflict? Or, what if the objective is an attempt to create
discord between two allies? Further, what if the objective is to divide the
leadership and/or membership of the opponent? In other words, should
"strategic bargaining" in which there is no genuine intent to negotiate, but
where other calculations are the primary objective-be regarded as
prenegotiation? Only if one accepts strategic bargaining as prenegotiation,
would it be possible to argue that in the case of Western Sahara, there have
been instances, albeit failed, of prenegotiation. The best that can be said is
that there have been periodic contacts, both direct and indirect, between the
parties. Each party has had different motives for making contact and each
has held out the promise-never fulfilled-that it would prepare for
negotiation.
In this Article, I will argue that: (1) only one party to the Western Sahara
conflict, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de
Oro (POLISARIO), has sought to negotiate, whereas the other, Morocco, has
used strategic bargaining as a way of circumventing pre-negotiations and has
never had any intention of "getting to the table"; (2) domestic imperatives,
cultural factors, and the support, ambivalence or weakness of outside powers,
have played a crucial role in preventing Morocco from undertaking genuine
prenegotiations; (3) whatever the evolution of the conflict and regardless of
changes in the domestic, regional, and international contexts, unless a credible
process of negotiation is initiated, there is no reason to believe that the
Western Sahara conflict will end in the foreseeable future.

4. I. William Zartman, Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions, in GETTING TO THE TABLE:
THE PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL PRENEGOTIATION 1, 4 (Janice Gross Stein, ed. 1989).
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I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT
After the Namibian issue was successfully resolved in Spring 1990, the
Western Sahara dispute, dating back to 1975, became one of the longest
running regional conflicts, and the last unresolved decolonization issue in
Africa. The necessary ingredients for solving the conflict have been present
for many years and some "ripe moments" for resolution have been missed.5
Because scholars are divided over the conflict in Western Sahara, depending
on their sympathy or lack thereof for the Sahrawi national liberation
movement, my description of the genesis of the conflict will rest primarily on
those questions that, whatever their rationality, find their support in
international law. 6
The origin of the Western Sahara conflict lies in the fact that Spain, the
colonial power since 1884, failed to abide by its commitment to hold a
referendum on self-determination in the Spanish Sahara. Such a referendum
was first demanded by the United Nations in 1965' and by the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) in 1972.8 Spain's attempt to hold the referendum
in 1974 was interrupted when Mauritania and Morocco-the latter of which
had "historic" claims over the entire territory-persuaded the U.N. General
Assembly to adopt a resolution on December 13, 1974' which solicited the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), without prejudice to the application of the

5. See I.

WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION:

AFRICA (1985).

CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN

For other detailed accounts of the origins of the conflict and its evolution, see
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT (Yahia Zoubir & Daniel
Volman eds., 1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS]; TONY HODGES, WESTERN
SAHARA: THE ROOTS OF A DESERT WAR (1983), updated andpublished in French as SAHARA
OCCIDENTAL: ORIGINES ET ENJEUX D'UNE GUERRE DU DESERT (1987) [hereinafter SAHARA
OCCIDENTAL].
6. Hodges, Zoubir, and Volman are favorable to the right of the Sahrawi people to selfdetermination as expressed in resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African
Unity. See HODGES, supra note 5; INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5. Zartman supports
Moroccan territorial claims to Western Sahara, or at least a compromise between Algeria and
Morocco. He believes that "there is little interest in seeing additional states carved out of the
Sahara, for they can only be further cases of African balkanization, needing financial and
development assistance, open to competing influences from neighbors, and a rising temptation
to outside powers' interference." ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 26. It is questionable-especially
in the post Cold-War era-how valid such arguments are. Can a people really be denied selfdetermination only because they may later need foreign assistance? In fact, Western Sahara has
much more wealth (phosphates, fisheries, natural gas, many valuable minerals, and a vast
potential for tourism) than many newly recognized states. Damis is also sympathetic to
Morocco's claims. See JOHN DAMIS, CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN SAHARA
DISPUTE (1983).

7. G.A. Res. 2072, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
8. Resolution on the so-calledSpanish Sahara,A.H.G. Res. 272, 9th Ord. Sess., Rabat, June
12-15, 1972, taken into considerationby G.A. Res. 2983, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 84-85,
U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). See HODGES, supra note 5, at 107.
9. G.A. Res. 3292, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 103-04, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
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principles embodied in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV),' ° to give
an advisory opinion at an early date on the following questions:
"1. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time
of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terranullis)?"
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
"2. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?""
It is important to cite the conclusion of the ICJ at length:
The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence,
at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the
Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western
Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights
relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian
entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On
the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information
presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the
territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such nature as might
affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of
Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination
through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the
Territory. 12

Unquestionably, whatever one's political or ideological leanings, the holding
of the ICJ unequivocally rejected both Morocco's and Mauritania's claims to
pre-colonial territorial sovereignty over the Spanish Sahara and upheld the
Sahrawis' right to self-determination. King Hassan, however, was not
persuaded. He interpreted this ruling as an affirmation of Morocco's own

10. Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). It is
important to note that this right to self-determination for all non-self-governing territories was
coupled with respect for the territorial integrity of the given territory as it advanced toward
independence. For a good discussion of this issue, see Thomas Franck, The Theory and Practice
of Decolonization-The Western Saharan Case, in WAR AND REFUGEES: THE WESTERN SAHARA
CONFLICT 9-15 (Richard Lawless & Laila Monahan eds., 1987) [hereinafter WAR AND
REFUGEES];

Anthony G. Pazzanita, The Proposed Referendum in the Western Sahara:

Background, Developments, and Prospects, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 187
[hereinafter The Proposed Referendum].
11. G.A. Res. 3292, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 104, U.N. Doc. A19631

(1974).
12. Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 68 (Oct. 16). For elaborate discussions
of the ICJ's opinion, see HODGES, supra note 5, at 368; Thomas Franck, The Stealing of the
Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976); George Joff6, The International Court of Justice and
the Western Sahara Dispute, in WAR AND REFUGEES, supra note 10, at 16. See also GERHARD
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 32224 (4th ed. 1981).
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claims,"3 discarded the Court's opinion, and launched the so called "Green
March" of 350,000 Moroccans (civilians and troops) into the territory. The
March was the prelude to Morocco's (re)colonization of Western Sahara. It
must be emphasized that Western Sahara is not a case where a territory
seceded from a recognized country. In fact, POLISARIO-founded in 1973
by Sahrawi nationalists to liberate the territory-seeks self-determination
within the Spanish colonial boundaries, thus accounting for the relative ease
with which the proclaimed state was admitted to the OAU in 1984.14
Under the terms of the Madrid Accords of November 1975, Spain,
succumbing to pressure from the United States, 5 ceded administrative
control over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania on February 26,
1976.16 This led to tension with Algeria, the main supporter of the Sahrawi
nationalist cause. The heightened tension doomed prospects for a peaceful
settlement. Clearly, both Morocco and Mauritania were opposed to the
holding of a referendum on self-determination for fear that the Sahrawis
would vote overwhelmingly for independence. 7 In fact, one day before the
ICJ rendered its opinion on Western Sahara on October 16, the U.N. mission
of inquiry published its report in which it concluded that "the majority of the
population within the Spanish Sahara was manifestly in favor of independence."'"
POLISARIO, which since its creation had led attacks against Spanish
colonial forces, now shifted the focus of its guerrilla war to Moroccan and,
until their withdrawal in 1979, Mauritanian troops. The day Spain finally
withdrew on February 27, 1976, POLISARIO proclaimed Western Sahara an
independent state, to be known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR)."9 Algeria's recognition of the new state on March 6 led Morocco
and Mauritania to break off diplomatic relations with their eastern neighbor. 20 Further, Moroccan bombardments of the refugee camps set up outside

13. Morocco's response to the ICJ's opinion was as follows: "The Opinion of the Court can
only mean one thing ...The so-called Western Sahara was a part of Moroccan territory over
which the sovereignty was exercised by the Kings of Morocco and the population of this territory
considered themselves and were considered to be Moroccans. . . . Today, Moroccan demands
have been recognized by the legal advisory organ of the United Nations." Press release of the
Permanent Mission of Morocco to the U.N., October 16, 1975, quoted in HODGES, supra note
5, at 210.
14.

BENYAMN NEUBERGER, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA

28 (1986).
15. See generally LEO KAMIL, FUELING THE FIRE: U.S. POLICY AND THE WESTERN
SAHARA CONFLICT (1987).
16. Agreement on the Question of Western Sahara, Nov. 14, 1975, Morocco-MauritaniaSpain, reprintedin Third Report by the Secretary-Generalin Pursuanceof Resolution 379 (1975)
Relating to the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/11880, annex I (1975).
17. Spanish Sahara: Their Best Chance, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1975, at 58.
18. Report of United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 23, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/10023/Rev.1 (1975).
19. PAUL BALTA, LE GRAND MAGHREB DES INDEPENDANCES A L'AN 2000 175 (1990).
20. How Unstable is Africa? THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1976, at 58.
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the major Sahrawi cities, created a new wave of forced migrations. 2' Tens
of thousands of Sahrawi refugees now found sanctuary in the southwestern
part of Algeria (near Tindouf), where camps administered by POLISARIO
were set up.22
Moreover, continued Algerian support for
POLISARIO-motivated by that country's traditional commitment to
movements of national liberation, compelling geopolitical considerations, and
mistrust of its regional rival-led to Moroccan threats of "hot pursuit" against
Sahrawis living in the Tindouf area, in retaliation for POLISARIO attacks
against Moroccan positions in Western Sahara. 23 An all-out war between
Algeria and Morocco was avoided, although two deadly clashes did occur in
January and February 1976.24 On the diplomatic level, the two regional
rivals squared off over the Western Sahara issue, staking out positions that
they continue to hold to this day. Morocco has sought support for its
irredentist claims from its traditional allies in the West, as well as from
conservative African countries. Algeria has extended material and political
support to POLISARIO and has sought to convince the OAU and the NonAligned movement that decolonization of Westem Sahara should pursue its
course to Sahrawi independence. The Sahrawis, for their part, in addition to
forming an army and building state structures,25 undertook diplomatic
activities throughout the world to obtain backing for their cause.
Reassured by continued French and U.S. military assistance-and by
strong domestic support from its political parties and the population at
large-Morocco set out to strengthen its military position in the occupied
territory.2 6 In order to fortify its occupation of Western Sahara, Morocco
began making extensive investments in the former colony and encouraged its
citizens to settle there.27 Moroccan settlement had the effect of displacing
Sahrawis, who moved to the north and to southern Morocco.2S Morocco also
began a process of militarization which almost doubled the size of its armed
forces.29
Convinced of Morocco's "historic and legitimate" claims to the territory,
King Hassan viewed Sahrawi nationalists as Moroccan secessionists sponsored
21. See generally BALTA, supra note 19, at 174-75; ABDELKHALEQ BERRAMDANE, LE
SAHARA OCCIDENTAL:

ENJEU MAGHREBIN 61 (1992).

22. BALTA, supra note 19, at 175, 213. See NICOLE GRIMAUD, LA POLITIQuE ExTEIEuRE
DE L'ALGtRIE 324 (1984); BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 54-56, 62, 84.
23. Cf BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 84.
24. HODGES, supra note 5, at 232. See also Western Sahara: War Stories, THE ECONOMIST,

Feb. 7, 1976, at 49.
25. See Stephen Zunes, Building a PeaceableKingdom in Wartime, FRIENDS JOURNAL, July
1988, at 22; HODGES, supra note 5, at 337-348.
26. See HODGES, supra note 5, at 293-306.
27. Id at 229-32.
28. Robert Bookmiller, The Western Sahara: Future Prospects, AMERICAN-ARAB AFFAIRS,

Summer 1991, at 64, 65. See also Yahia Zoubir, Western Sahara Conflict Impedes Maghrib
Unity, MIDDLE EAST REP., Mar.-Apr., 1990, at 28, 29 [hereinafter Conflict Impedes Maghrib
Unity].
29. HODGES, supra note 5, at 293-95.
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by the Algerian government.3" Thus, he adamantly refused to recognize the
question of Western Sahara as a decolonization issue or to agree to talks with
POLISARIO. 3' The contention in this Article is that King Hassan, to this
day, has not moved away from this position. Even though direct and indirect
talks have taken place, they were part and parcel of the King's periodic
maneuverings, for he was convinced-and probably still is-that real
negotiations will eventually be with the Algerians. The Algerians, for their
part, have always insisted that they have no territorial claims, nor are they an
active party to the conflict. They are not disinterested, however. They define
their position as one of a "concerned" party (partie intdressie)to the conflict
and would not agree to any illegitimate annexation of the territory by
Morocco.
Despite their numerical superiority, Moroccan troops suffered severe
military defeats.3 2 In the first few years of the conflict, the main concern
for outside regional and international powers was the permanent situation of
casus belli between Algeria and Morocco; yet, there was no war, and
communication between the two countries never ceased, despite the absence
of diplomatic relations. A kind of modus vivendi, whereby no direct military
confrontation between the two regional giants was permitted to occur, has
been in place since the two major clashes at Amgala in 1976--despite King
Hassan's threats of hot pursuit thereafter. As of 1977, Algeria's leadership
declared that no bilateral disputes existed between the two countries; its
policy consisted of urging Moroccan and POLISARIO representatives to
pursue direct negotiations.33 In many ways, this has remained Algeria's
policy until the present. At the height of the diplomatic war with Morocco,
the objective was to have the international organizations endorse the principle
of self-determination for the Sahrawi people and direct negotiations as the
main avenue for achieving an equitable solution. Perhaps it is worth
mentioning that, whatever other considerations, this position was a reflection
of Algeria's own historical experience.34
Even if Morocco rejected the principle of negotiations with POLISARIO,
it did seek to build bridges with Algeria while remaining steadfast in the
situation on the ground. The major initiative was launched by the King
himself who proposed, through an emissary, the holding of bilateral
discussions. His own sister, Princess Al'cha, would represent him. Indeed,
she met in December 1977 with Algerian president Houari Boum6di~ne's
political advisor, Dr. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, in Lausanne, Switzerland.35
The King's advisor, Ahmed R6da Guedira replaced the Princess in the several

30. Id. at 312.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 284-91.
33. GRIMAUD, supra note 22, at 213.
34. See generally id.
35. ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 49.
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talks that were held between the two advisors during the first six months of
1978.36 A working document was elaborated and was meant to serve as the
basis for discussion for the two heads of state, who were scheduled to meet
in Brussels on July 6, 1978." Morocco had apparently agreed to make
substantial concessions regarding the division of the territory between
POLISARIO and Morocco.38 However, King Hassan decided not to leave
for the meeting in Brussels, perhaps because he was aware of the coup d'6tat
that was in the making in Mauritania. 39
In October 1978, the King's envoys, Ahmed R6da Guedira, Ahmed
Dlimi, and Ahmed Bensouda met in Bamako, Mali, with Mahmoud
Abdelfattah, a very young and inexperienced low-level POLISARTO official.
The meeting took place in the presence of the president of Mali, Moussa
Traor6. The nature of the contact was "quite superficial and was aimed at
testing what the Algerians were really up to. The Moroccan side also tried
to lure us into giving up the fight through making us all kinds of offers."4
Apparently, the King also offered POLISARIO leaders cabinet positions in
his government if they abandoned their struggle for independence and urged
them to enter Mauritanian politics, since a change of government had
occurred in that country.4 1 The real reasons behind Morocco's seemingly
conciliatory approach were the country's military setbacks against
POLISARIO forces and the fear that the conflict would spread beyond the
southern borders, inside Moroccan territory itself.
Although it has already been dealt with in greater detail elsewhere,4 2 the
situation that led to the Bamako negotiations between POLISARIO and
Mauritania ought to be discussed, albeit briefly. POLISARIO pursued a twotack policy vis-t-vis Mauritania, the weakest of its two opponents, but also
the closest ethnically and linguistically.43 POLISARIO troops launched
intensive attacks aimed at crippling Mauritania's economic base, while
making continued diplomatic contacts for a separate peace. The success of
POLISARIO attacks resulted on July 10, 1978 in a military coup in
Mauritania. 4
This prompted a cease-fire by POLISARIO fighters.45
Shortly after, extensive discussions were held in September in Paris between

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. BALTA, supra note 19, at 224.
39. For a detailed account of the coup, see HODGES, supra note 5, at 257-65.
40. Interview with Mahmoud Abdelfattah, POLISARIO official in Geneva (Jan. 17, 1994).
Mr. Abdelfattah is today a member of the POLISARIO's National Directorate and president of
the commission of identification of eligible voters in the referendum for self-determination to be
decided by the United Nations.
41. HODGES, supra note 5, at 329.
42. ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 49-50.

43. HODGES, supra note 5, at 262-63.
44. Ronald Koven, MauritanianPresident Overthrown in Military Coup, WASH. POST, July
11, 1978, at A8.

45. Ceasefire in Mauritania,WASH. POST, July 13, 1978, at A17.
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Sahrawis and Mauritanians.46 A few weeks afterward, Mauritanian and
POLISARIO officials met in Bamako, in the presence of two of Hassan's
closest collaborators. 47 News of Algerian president Boumddi~ne's serious
illness reduced the King's interest in talking to POLISARIO; however,
although POLISARIO broke its unilateral cease-fire with Mauritania-due to
the latter's failure to withdraw from Tiris el Gharbia, the portion of the
territory it occupied-the renewed attacks brought the Mauritanians to the
negotiating table, and resulted, on August 10, 1979, in the peace agreement
signed in
Algiers that brought an end to Mauritania's involvement in the
48
conflict.
Prior to that agreement, Morocco (and Mauritania) had hoped that Chadli
Bendjedid, the successor of Boum6di6ne who died in December 1978, would
be more amenable to Morocco's irredentist claims and that he would be
willing to "sell out" the Sahrawis in exchange for joint exploitation of the
rich resources of the territory. 49 Their hopes went unfulfilled. Chadli
Bendjedid, under pressure from the military to be sure, made no concessions
whatsoever on Algeria's position concerning Western Sahara. Like his
predecessor, he refused to negotiate in lieu of POLISARIO.
In the peace agreement with POLISARIO, Mauritania "solemnly declares
that it does not have and will not have territorial or any other claims over
Western Sahara" and "decides to withdraw from the unjust war in the
Western Sahara."50 Attached was a secret clause in which the Military
Committee for National Safety pledged "[to] put an end to its presence in the
Western Sahara and to hand over directly to the Polisario Front the part of
the Western Sahara that it controls within 7 months from the date of the
signing the present agreement."'
The French and Mauritanian idea of a
Sahrawi mini-state that circulated for a while was, for different and obvious
reasons, acceptable neither to the Moroccans, who saw it as a foothold from
which POLISARIO could regain the Moroccan-occupied portion of the
territory and legitimize the national aspirations of the Sahrawis, nor to
POLISARIO which demanded nothing less than full independence within pre1975 boundaries.5 2 The peace agreement led to the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations between Algeria and Mauritania a few days after it was
signed. But in the meantime, Morocco took over most of the sectors
previously held by Mauritania before the secret clause of the agreement could
be implemented. 3

46. HODGES, supra note 5, at 270.

47.
48.
annex I
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 270-71.
Mauritano-Sahraoui Agreement, Aug. 10, 1979, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/34/427,
(S/13503) (1979).
BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 84.
Mauritano-Sahraoui Agreement, supra note 48, B.
Modalities of the Peace Agreement, reprinted in KAMIL, supra note 15, app. 3, art 1.

52. HODGES, supra note 5, at 267.
53. David Seddon, Morocco at War, in WAR AND REFUGEES, supra note 10, at 98, 103.
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From the analysis so far, it appears very clearly that in the Mauritanian
case, there was genuine intent to enter negotiation with POLISARIO
following the military coup against President Mokhtar Ould Dadda. The
ceaseless POLISARIO attacks on Mauritania had proved too costly for that
poor country. Yet Mauritania's post-coup leaders hoped to see a global peace
settlement because of the fear that a bilateral accord with POLISARIO would
alienate King Hassan, whose military forces were still present in Mauritania
as a result of the 1977 military pact. 4 This explains why they sought
approval from France, their stronger ally, before initiating any contacts with
POLISARIO. The Mauritanians hoped that France-whose considerable
economic interests in Algeria had been damaged due to French intervention
on behalf of Mauritania and its backing of Morocco on the Western Sahara
issue (despite its declared neutrality)--would put pressure on Morocco to find
a global solution to the problem. But King Hassan, who had mobilized his
entire country over the Western Sahara issue, could not allow Mauritania to
make territorial arrangements with POLISARIO. From a Moroccan point of
view, Algeria, not POLISARIO, was the proper party with which to negotiate.
This, however, did not prevent Mauritania from engaging in prenegotiations with POLISARIO. For its part, Mauritania acknowledged that
"POLISARIO is a reality which we recognize, perhaps not as exclusive
representative, but we know it exists and has a role to play in the peace
process."55 Despite Mauritanian leaders' ambivalence, owing to their fear
of Morocco, their willingness to talk to POLISARIO compelled the Sahrawis
to extend the cease-fire they had unilaterally decreed.
Meanwhile
POLISARIO had set certain conditions for permanent peace with Mauritania,
while continuing direct contacts. Mauritania's misfortune, however, stemmed
from being caught between two impossible situations: a threatening and
intransigent Morocco on the one hand and an impatient POLISARIO on the
other. The resumption of POLISARIO attacks against Mauritania, a year
after the cease-fire was instituted, prompted the Mauritanian leadership to
overcome its hesitations and fears by accepting negotiations for a peace treaty
which mirrored the terms set by POLISARIO's Fourth Congress held in late
September 1978.
Clearly, Mauritania's post-coup gesture toward the POLISARIO can be
defined as prenegotiation, since, in this particular case, the Mauritanians
"consider[ed] negotiation as a policy option and communicate[d] this intention
to other parties."5 6 The Mauritanians succeeded in persuading POLISARIO
that a joint solution to a common problem was possible. This phase ended
when the Mauritanian and Sahrawi leaders met in Algiers to iron out the
details of a peace agreement.
In twenty years since the Western Sahara conflict erupted, this was the

54.

HODGES,

supra note 5, at 271.

55. Id. at 270 (quoting Mauritanian foreign minister, Sheikhna Ould Laghdaf).
56. Prenegotiation,supra note 4, at 4.
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only instance where the notion of prenegotiation applies, for there have never
been similar situations involving POLISARIO and Morocco. As far as
Algeria and Morocco were concerned, there were occasions which could
easily be described as prenegotiations. But there has been no attempt, on the
part of the Moroccans, to initiate prenegotiation with the Sahrawis. The core
of the problem lies in the fact that Morocco made it an official policy not to
recognize POLISARIO as a negotiating partner, whereas Algeria refused to
negotiate with Morocco in lieu of the Sahrawi nationalists. This is not to say,
however, that negotiation between Morocco and POLISARIO will never
occur. The cases of the FLN and France, and the Israelis and the PLO, are
good examples of such a reversal in official policy.
II. DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERINGS AND INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS
Unwilling to wage war, Algeria and Morocco sought to convince their
friends and foes of the righteousness of their respective positions. A brief
review of the period 1977-1985 will summarize the major events.
Both war and peace threatened Mauritania. On March 17, 1981, one day
after an attempted coup by disgruntled Mauritanian officers, Mauritania broke
diplomatic relations with Morocco, accusing it of being directly involved."
Because Mauritania feared Morocco's continuing irredentist claims to
Mauritanian territory, it progressively adopted an attitude of neutrality in the
conflict.5 8
Mauritania, however, remained supportive of resolutions
favorable to the SADR in international organizations. At the same time,
Mauritania did its best to improve relations with Morocco. Although by that
time, Mauritania's position on the conflict was closer to Algeria's, fear and
realism compelled it to reach an agreement with Morocco later in 1981.59
By 1983, Mauritania had entered the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord with
Algeria and Tunisia,6" and on February 27, 1984 it recognized the SADR. 6"
The SADR, meanwhile, made important gains, especially at the OAU and
the U.N. This was due in large part to Algeria's diplomatic, logistical and
political support, and also to the growing popularity of the Sahrawis' cause
in Third World countries, as well as its military successes. By 1979, the
OAU adopted a decision in which it called for a cease-fire and the holding
of a free referendum in which the Sahrawi people could exercise their right

57. REUTERS, Mar. 18, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES file. Morocco
reciprocated in kind the next day. Id.
58. See Mauritaniais Moving Closerto its Radical Neighbors, WASH. POST, May 20, 1981,
at A19.
59. HODGES, supra note 5, at 325.
60. See Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, Mar. 19, 1983, AIg.-Tunis., reprintedin XXII
ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD 694-95 (1983) (French text). On the Greater Maghreb
generally, see Robert A. Mortimer, The Greater Maghreb and the Western Sahara, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 168-83.
61. Anthony G. Pazzanita, Mauritania's Foreign Policy: the Search for Protection, 30 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 281, 290-91 (1992).
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to self-determination.62 The choice offered would be total independence,
preservation of the status quo, a meeting between all the parties involved in
the conflict, etc. In the same year, the U.N. General Assembly recognized
POLISARIO as the representative of the Sahrawi people.63 In July 1980,
the question of the SADR's admission as a member of the OAU was raised,
while in November 1980, the U.N. General Assembly urged Morocco to
begin negotiations with POLISARIO.64 In June 1981, responding to a
nudge from the U.S. and France, and because he feared the possible
admission of the SADR to the OAU, King Hassan reversed his position on
holding a referendum and declared at the OAU Summit in Nairobi that he
would accept "a controlled referendum whose modalities should give justice
simultaneously to the objectives of the [OAU's] ad hoc committee, that is to
say the committee of wise men, and to Morocco's conviction regarding the
legitimacy of its rights."65
As has become clear since, the King never had any serious intention of
allowing the holding of a referendum that he might lose, a position he
strongly maintains today. In fact, upon his return to Morocco he stated
unambiguously that, "I see the referendum as an act of confirmation" and
made it explicit that he rejected the idea that POLISARIO was party to the
conflict by declaring that, "For me, the parties interested in the Saharan affair
remain Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, to the exclusion of Polisario, which
' In August
has never existed for the African community."66
1981, an eightpoint resolution regarding the implementation of a referendum in Western
Sahara was adopted following the OAU's Nairobi summit.67 An Implementation Committee, composed of African heads of state was mandated to take,
with the participation of the United Nations, all necessary measures to
guarantee the exercise of a general and regular referendum on self-determination by the people of Western Sahara.68 To this effect, an immediate ceasefire was to be observed,6 9 and a peacekeeping force was to be provided
jointly by the U.N. and the OAU which would then be stationed in Western
Sahara to guarantee security during the referendum and supervise the ceasefire.7" In pursuance of its mandate, the Implementation Committee deter-

62. Resolution on the question of Western Sahara, A.H.G. Dec. 114, 16th Ord. Sess.,
Monrovia, July 17-20, 1979, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/34/552, annex 11 (1979).
63. G.A. Res. 37, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 203-04, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979).
64. G.A. Res. 19, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 213-14, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1980).
65. HODGES, supra note 5, at 311; The ProposedReferendum, supra note 10, at 195.
66. Roland Delcour, Le refdrendum peut 6tre organisi en trois ou quatre mois, declare le
roi Hassan 11, LE MONDE, July 4, 1981, at 6.
67. Resolution on Western Sahara, A.H.G. Res. 103, 18th Ord. Sess., Nairobi, June 24-27,
1981, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/36/534, annex 11 (1981).
68. Id. 7.
69. Id. 4.
70. Id. 6.
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mined inter alia that the troops in the conflict would be confined to their
bases, 7' those Sahrawis eligible to vote would be those listed in the 1974
Spanish census and relevant UNHCR documents,72 the choice offered to the
Sahrawis would be independence or integration with Morocco, 73 votes would
be cast by secret ballot, 74 and the Implementation Committee would
establish an impartial administrative authority headed by a commissioner
which would cooperate with local administrative structures, the OAU, and the
U.N., to organize the referendum. 75
The OAU resolutions reflected a compromise between the positions of
Morocco (no recognition of POLISARIO, no negotiations with them, and no
withdrawal of Morocco's troops or administration) and of Algeria (a
genuinely free referendum, an interim administration, and a peacekeeping
force). Although it has been argued that these resolutions constituted a good
basis for a referendum, 76 one might also say that what prevented progress
toward a referendum was the exclusion by Morocco of POLISARIO as an
independent actor, treating it simply as an agent of Algeria, at a time when
the SADR was obtaining numerous recognitions. Moroccans were totally
opposed to talking to POLISARIO, let alone entering negotiations with its
leaders.
Moroccan Foreign Minister, M'Hammed Boucetta declared
unequivocally:
For us the Polisario does not exist either legally or internationally. We will
never recognize the Polisario. There will be no withdrawal of Moroccan
troops from our Saharan province, and there is no way that the Moroccan
administration will leave the Western Sahara territory."
There is more than a political element in Morocco's consistent refusal to
negotiate with POLISARIO. In February 1982, Mr. Boucetta made a
statement, the underlying rationale of which went beyond the legal norms he
emphasized. He stated that:
Polisario is not recognized as a liberation movement. What is called the
SADR is not recognized as a state. His Majesty the King has clearly stated
that Morocco will only negotiate with its equals, with recognized states
[i.e., Algeria and Mauritania] ...to seal or close, or render airtight, their

71. Decision of the OA U Implementation Committee on Western Sahara,IMP.C. Dec. 1, 1st
Ord. Sess., Nairobi, Aug. 24-26, 1981,
(c)(III), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/36/512, annex
(S/14692) (1981) [hereinafter Decision of the Implementation Committee].
72. Id. (a)(III).
73. Id. (a)(V).
74. Id. (a)(IV).
75. Id. (b).
76. ZARTMAN,supra note 5, at 91-92.
77. The Proposed Referendum, supra note 10, at 220 n.45 (quoting N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10,

1982).
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frontiers, so that incursions cease on all sides.7"
The psychological element shows clearly in the italicized statement. Indeed,
it is very hard, from a Moroccan point of view, to conceive that the King,
who has a centuries-old monarchy behind him, would negotiate with poor
nomads, "uncouth Bedouins." Not even the Moroccan opposition parties are
allowed to negotiate with the King. They are expected to feel privileged
enough that the King agrees to listen to what their representatives have to say.
The King, who symbolizes so many things, cannot be put on the same level
with the opposition parties, let alone with individuals, in this case the Sahrawi
nationalists, whom he considers to be the stooges of a foreign government.
The closest to a recognition POLISARIO representatives were able to get
from the King was in the late 1980s when he described them as Moroccan
subjects "who went astray."7 9 Therefore, one should not easily discount the
psychological dimension in this conflict, to wit: King Hassan cannot "lower"
his prestige by meeting with a non-state entity on an equal footing.
III. THE QUEST FOR A RESOLUTION AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS
Little progress was made after the Nairobi Summit mostly because of
Morocco's refusal to recognize POLISARIO as its opponent. The OAU's
Implementation Committee sought not to aggravate Morocco's sensitivity on
the issue of recognition of its adversary. Therefore, although it knew well
who the warring parties were, the Committee decided not to name them,"0
thus failing to get them to negotiate, even indirectly. This situation was
interpreted as victory by the Moroccans, who saw a confirmation of their
position that "No one is duped any longer. Algeria, that's Polisario, and
Polisario is nothing other than Algeria."'" The Committee failed despite its
statement that "a total cease-fire
... will take effect after consultations with
82
all the concerned parties.5
POLISARIO and Algeria responded by pushing successfully on February
22, 1982 for the admission of the SADR to the OAU.83 The actual
admission of the SADR (which for many reasons did not actually take place

78. LE MATIN DU SAHARA (Casablanca), Feb. 10, 1982, cited in HODGES, supra note 5, at

314 (emphasis added).
79. King Hassan H Addresses Green March Anniversary, F.B.I.S.-NEAR EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA [hereinafter F.B.I.S.-N.E.S.], Nov. 7, 1988, at 15.
80. See Decision of the Implementation Committee, supra note 71.
314.

81.

LE MATIN DU SAHARA (Casablanca), Feb. 20, 1982, cited in HODGES, supra note 5, at

82. EL MOUDJAHID (Algiers), Feb. 11, 1982, cited in HODGES, supra note 5, at 314.

83. HODGES, supra note 5, at 314-15. The decision to admit the SADR was made at the
OAU foreign ministers' meeting in Addis Abada. The OAU secretariat, based on the fact that
twenty-six member states (a majority) had recognized the SADR, admitted it to the organization
without submitting the matter to a vote. See Please Pretend You Aren't There, THE ECONOMIST,
July 17, 1982, at 35. Nineteen states walked out in protest. Id.
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until 1984) was followed in June 1983 by a resolution of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government, which exhorted Morocco and the
POLISARIO-now named explicitly as the two parties to the conflictto undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a cease-fire
to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum of
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, a referendum without
any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the
Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations. 4
The target date for a referendum was December 1983.85
Through Saudi mediation, a meeting took place between Bendjedid and
King Hassan on February 26, 1983, four months before the OAU resolution
was adopted. 6 The greater affinity between the two men created a good
atmosphere, but did little to resolve the conflict because both maintained their
respective positions. There was hope that the meeting would lead to a
reconciliation between the two states, that the Sahrawi dossier would have a
peaceful ending, and that regional cooperation would outweigh the existing
problems. Optimism was very high, for the King is said to have hinted in the
conversation: "Leave the stamp and the flag for me and everything else is
negotiable.""7 The meeting did not produce any tangible results, for the
Algerians did not think that the King had made any noticeable changes in his
position, whereas the King felt that the Algerians were seeking to use regional
integration as a stratagem to impose the SADR as the sixth Maghrebi state.88
According to Zartman, however, aides of the two heads of state discussed a
possible compromise on Western Sahara which might be reached before the
upcoming OAU meeting in Addis Ababa and thus constitute the basis of an
OAU resolution.89 In essence, the deal was that Morocco would agree to
have a direct meeting with POLISARIO representatives, and in exchange,
Algeria would enjoin POLISARIO not to seek OAU membership, but to
push, instead, for an early referendum; "Autonomy, federation, and other
outcomes less than independence were discussed." 90
In April, a secret meeting was held in the Algerian capital between the
King's advisor, his foreign and interior ministers and three high-level
POLISARIO leaders. According to Hodges, the King's emissaries offered the

84. Resolution on Western Sahara,A.H.G. Res. 104, 19th Ord. Sess., Addis Ababa, June
6-12, 1983, reprintedin U.N. Doc. A/38/312 (1983).
85. ANTHONY PAZZANITA & TONY HODGES, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN SAHARA

324 (2d
86.
87.
88.

ed. 1994).
Morocco-Algeria Meeting, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1983, at A18.
BALTA, supra note 19, at 181.
See Robert A. Mortimer, The Greater Maghreb and the Western Sahara,in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 169-85.
89. ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 57.

90. Id.
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Sahrawis autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. 91 This
proposal was rejected by POLISARIO leaders who demanded full sovereignty
for the Sahrawi people.92 According to a POLISARIO official, the Moroccans did not make any serious proposition even regarding the proferred
autonomy:
What they proposed to us was an offer for jobs in the Moroccan government. They also told us that the [Moroccan] nation was forgiving and
merciful. We proposed that serious negotiations take place to resolve this
conflict. We demanded no less than independence, but we assured the
Moroccans that their interests would be taken into account.93
One appreciable aspect of the February meeting between Hassan and
Bendjedid is that, according to some analysts, it signaled the beginning of
divisions within the Algerian leadership between those favorable to making
concessions to the Moroccans at the expense of the Sahrawis and those who
remained inflexible on the issue.94 This may be plausible, for some highranking officers in the Algerian military and POLISARIO officials today
admit that Bendjedid was very much in favor of an entente with Morocco and
was opposed to a Moroccan military defeat.95 The Algerian military,
apparently, was intent on either intervening directly against Morocco or
allowing an all-out offensive by POLISARIO forces with substantial Algerian
backing in order to break the deadlock and to prevent Morocco from
achieving afait accompli in the territory. 96 This desire was especially strong
after the completion of the rather effective defensive walls built around the
so called "useful triangle" which consists of the phosphate-rich area of AlAyoun, Smara, and Bu-Craa.9 7 According to these sources, Bendjedid
succeeded in preventing such a decision by the high-command. 98 The
suspicious death on January 25, 1983, of General Ahmed Dlimi, commander
of the Moroccan armed forces, may sustain this hypothesis, for Dlimi was
said to be in close contact with Algerian officials and, apparently, with
POLISARIO leaders as well. He was depicted as favorable to a negotiated
settlement with POLISARIO. 99 However, POLISARIO officials deny that
any such contacts with Dlimi ever occurred.
91. SAHARA OCCIDENTAL, supra note 5, at 437.

92. Id.
93. Interview in Geneva (Mar. 1994).
94. Nicole Grimaud, La diplomatie sous Chadli ou la politique du possible, 30 ANNUAIRE
DE L'AFRIQUE Du NoRD 401, 411 (1994) [hereinafter politique du possible].
95. This information was revealed to the author by high-ranking Algerian military officers
and POLISARIO representatives.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Stephen Zunes, The United States and the Saharan War: A Case of Low-Intensity
Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 3, 71 [hereinafter Low-Intensity
Intervention]; Seddon, supra note 53, at 122.
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Yet there is also reason to believe that Bendjedid was not as favorable
to making concessions to Morocco as other sources seem to suggest. On the
basis of his own declarations, it seems that Bendjedid hoped that he could
play the role of mediator between the Moroccans and the Sahrawis.'0° In
a communiqu6 issued by the Algerian ministry of foreign affairs shortly after
the meeting it was stated that:
The problem of the Western Sahara is a problem of decolonization that
opposes our brothers of the Western Sahara to our Moroccan brothers.
Algeria has always affirmed that it is prepared to work toward bringing
closer our brothers of the Western Sahara and our brothers of Morocco in
order to find a solution in line with the inalienable right of the people of
the Western Sahara to self-determination and to independence. Algeria is
convinced that such a solution, while reestablishing peace in our region,
will make possible cooperation commensurate with the ideal of Maghrebi
unity.

It is in this spirit that Chadli Bendjedid . . .met with King

Hassan."'

At the OAU Summit held the following June, the Algerian president
explained the purpose of his meeting with Hassan:
I was very clear about Algeria's position on the question of the Western
Sahara.... I explained to the Moroccan King that I had no mandate to
speak in the name of the Sahrawis and that I would not arrogate myself the
right to speak in their name or to assume their trusteeship ....02
However, Chadli said he would "spare no effort" to reconcile Morocco and
the Saharawis, in the same way as he had10 helped
to bring together "the
3
brothers in Mauritania and Western Sahara.'

1

By March 1983, Algeria had already signed with Tunisia the Treaty of
Fraternity and Concord, which Mauritania adhered to in December the same
year, in the hope that Maghrebi unity would create a framework for a
definitive resolution of the Western Sahara conflict.' 4 It was expected that
both Morocco and Libya would join; instead, in August 1984 Morocco and
Libya united in an unholy alliance, known as the Treaty of Oujda. 5
The year 1984 was a crucial year in the development of the conflict in

100. SAHARA OCCIDENTAL, supra note 5, at 436-37; HODGES, supra note 5, at 365.
101. Alger: Le droit inalignable du peuple du Sahara Occidental a l'inddpendance, LE
MONDE, Mar. 1, 1983, at 3 (translation mine).
102. EL MOUDJAHID (Algiers), June 12, 1983, cited in HODGES, supra note 5, at 334.
103. Id
104. Mortimer, supra note 88, at 171-72.
105. Federation Agreement, Aug. 13, 1984, Libya-Morocco, reprinted in XVII AFRICA
CONTEMPORARY RECORD: ANNUAL SURVEY OF DOCUMENTS C20-22 (1984-85). The MoroccoLibya Treaty was intended to federate the two countries. It provided for a joint legislature, court,
and secretariat under the joint chairmanship of King Hassan and Col. Moammar Khadaffi. Id.
arts. 3, 5, & 7. The Treaty also called for a common foreign policy and cooperation in
economic, social and political matters. Id. arts. 8 & 9. It even included a mutual defense clause.
Id art. 12. See generally John Damis, Morocco, Libya and the Treaty of Union, AMERICAN-ARAB
AFFAIRS, Summer 1985, at 44-45.
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Western Sahara. At the OAU Twentieth Summit held in November, the
SADR finally took its seat as the fifty-first member of the organization with
little opposition.0 6 This, however, led to the withdrawal of Morocco, an
important and founding member of the organization.'0 7 The immediate
result of such a decision was the absence from the OAU of one of the two
parties to the dispute. This episode also marked the end of the handling of
the Western Sahara conflict by the OAU and its displacement to the United
Nations.
This shift was in fact sought by the Moroccans themselves although they
initially tried to avoid it. The Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri,
met in Lisbon in April 1985 with Bachir Mustapha Sayed, POLISARIO's
main negotiator and second man of the Sahrawi leadership. 01 8 Again, there
was no genuine attempt to negotiate. Rather, the Moroccan side sought to
convince the Sahrawis to "get back to their senses and return to reason."
In September 1985, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) adopted a
resolution at the foreign ministers' conference held in Luanda, Angola, which
supported the OAU's Resolution AHG 104 by endorsing its call for direct
negotiations. 0 9 Worse still for Morocco, two months earlier, in July,
Mohamed Abdelaziz, the SADR's president, had been elected one of the
OAU's vice presidents. King Hassan, accusing the OAU of partiality,
decided that the Western Sahara dossier be handled by the United Nations."' But, clearly, the U.N. arena, especially the General Assembly, was
more favorable to the SADR than the Moroccan authorities anticipated, for
the notion of direct negotiations between the belligerents, as sought by
Algeria and the SADR, appealed to the majority of the members. Even if the
question of Western Sahara had not been an important item on the
organization's agenda since 1975-76, many resolutions had reaffirmed the
"Sahrawis' inalienable right to self-determination and to independence" and
that only negotiations between the two parties would create the objective
conditions for a return to peace in the region and for a fair and regular
referendum."'
Nevertheless, through his move, the King hoped that he
could regain some of his lost prestige and credibility in the world body." 2
Morocco also hoped that, unlike the NAM, the U.N. would circumvent the
OAU's Resolution AHG 104 and subscribe to Morocco's view of a
referendum plan that would not necessitate direct negotiations with POLISA106. See OAU: Odd King Out, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1984, at 36.
107. Morocco is First Member to Quit 21-year old OA U, REUTERS N. EuRoP. Svc., Nov.
12, 1984, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES file.
108. Ben Amera, Polisarioand Morocco Reach Stalemate in War for Sahara,REUTERS No.
EuRoP. Svc., Apr. 25, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES file.
109. HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN SAHARA, supra note 85, at 307-08.
110. BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 93.
111. E.g., G.A. Res. 28, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 226-27, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982); G.A. Res. 40, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 221-22, U.N. Doc.
A/38/47 (1983).
112. The Proposed Referendum, supra note 10, at 198.
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RIO, despite the fact that previous U.N. General Assembly resolutions had
already done so. The U.N., however, despite Morocco's attempts to avoid the
necessity of direct negotiations, gave its unequivocal support to the OAU's
plan for direct negotiations, a cease-fire, an interim administration in the
occupied territory, and a referendum in the Western Sahara "without any
administrative or military constraints under the auspices of the Organization
of the African Unity and the United Nations.""' 3
Although Morocco's policy boomeranged, for the positions of the OAU
and the U.N. now coincided, as of early 1986 the U.N. Secretary-General,
Javier Prez de Cu~llar, sought to accommodate the parties to the conflict by
offering his good offices to arrange for indirect talks between POLISARIO
and Morocco." 4 Thus, two series of indirect discussions were held in New
York from April 9-15, 1986 and from May 5-9, 1986."' These separate
talks were held in the presence of the president of the OAU's personal
envoy. 16 The representatives of Algeria and Mauritania were informed of
the substance of the talks." 7 The U.N. Secretary-General gave the two
parties detailed questionnaires on six points relating to the different aspects
of the process of the planned referendum."' The two parties responded to
these questions and submitted them to the Secretary-General." 9 Of course,
this procedure was perfectly in line with Morocco's wishes, in that it
prevented the two parties from meeting face-to-face, hence avoiding direct
negotiations. Although the United Nations hoped that these indirect talks
would eventually result in direct negotiations and lay the conditions for a
cease-fire before the holding of a referendum, they merely allowed Morocco
to gain time and devise a new strategy. The Secretary-General's visit to
Morocco in July 1986 did little to alter Morocco's refusal to hold direct talks
with the Sahrawis.
Morocco's resolute opposition to negotiation with the Sahrawis was
predicated upon a number of factors: Algeria's "new pragmatism" and the
seeming divisions within the Algerian regime on Western Sahara; the Reagan
Administration's support for Morocco; and consolidation of the defensive
walls.
IV. ALGERIA'S "REVERSAL OF POLICY"
Although the meeting between King Hassan and Chadli Bendjedid in

113. G.A. Res. 50, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 268-69, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985).
114. The Proposed Referendum, supra note 10, at 198.
115. BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 94.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The Proposed Referendum, supra note 10, at 198.

119. Id.The parties' responses are reprinted in Nicole Grimaud, Le Sahara Occidental. une
issue possible?, MAGHREB-MACHREK, July-Sept. 1988, at 99-100 (Morocco), 104-05 (SADR).
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February 1983 did not produce any tangible results, it was described as
cordial and warm. 2 ' The two leaders agreed to a further meeting to be
held in Tunis; however, this never transpired. The fact that the agreed upon
meeting in Tunis did not take place was an indication, according to some
analysts, that several tendencies existed among policymakers in Algeria.'
Apparently, a segment of the leadership was favorable to making concessions
to Morocco to the detriment of the Sahrawis, whereas another faction was
inflexible on the Western Sahara issue.122 Further, the good rapport
between Hassan II and Bendjedid seemed to inaugurate a new era in
Algerian-Moroccan relations despite the absence of diplomatic relations.
Sensing a "turnabout" in Algeria's position, King Hassan agreed to listen
to a proposal made by Algerian jurists on a possible personal union between
the Sahrawis and Morocco.' 23 The Algerians had basically acted upon the
King's own suggestion: "leave me the stamp and the flag and everything else
is negotiable." The Algerians proposed a type of personal union between the
Sahrawis and the King whereby Hassan I1would be King of Morocco and of
Western Sahara. A Moroccan High Commissioner would be stationed in the
Sahrawi capital, Al Ayoun. However, Western Sahara would be independent
and run its own affairs. Defense and foreign affairs would also be in the
hands of the Sahrawis, but with close links to the Moroccans. The Moroccan
and Sahrawi flags would be displayed on all buildings. 4 In May 1985,
King Hassan rejected this proposal as not "serious."' 2s The truth, according
to POLISARIO officials, is that the Moroccan side did not agree to self-rule
by the Sahrawis, in that they refused to allow them to have control over their
own defense, foreign affairs, economy, and other administrative functions.' 26
While Algerian diplomacy gave signs of flexibility on Western Sahara,
the Moroccan side decided to retrench by seeking the maximum support from
its Western allies. The Treaty of Oujda with Libya having caused much
strain with its allies-albeit no reduction in military and economic assistance
from the United States and France-Morocco sought to regain the favor of
Washington and Paris by making a major move. While still president of the
Arab League, and president of the Islamic (Quds) Committee, the King held
direct talks in July 1986 with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres." 7
Hassan's main goal appeared to be to obtain congressional support in the
United States for Morocco's war in the Western Sahara, in the form of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
July 23,

politique du possible, supra note 94, at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Mahmood Abdelfattah, POLISARIO official in Geneva (Mar. 1994).
politique du possible, supra note 94, at 411 (citing a press conference).
Interview with high-ranking POLISARIO Official in Madrid (1994).
Judith Miller, Peres and Hassan in Talks, Syria Breaks Moroccan Ties, N.Y. TIMES,
1986, at Al.
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increased economic and military aid.'2 8 Another reason was surely to
attempt to prevent a closer rapprochement between Algeria and the United
States, following Bendjedid's historic visit to Washington in April 1985.129
The Treaty of Oujda, which had compelled Libya to stop forever its material
assistance to POLISARIO, was terminated by King Hassan on August 29,
1986.13° Yet despite all its political moves, Morocco still could not win the
war and remained diplomatically isolated.
In Fall 1986, Algeria continued to lay down the foundations of the
Greater Maghreb. Improved relations between Tripoli and Algiers, on the
one hand, and Tunis and Tripoli, on the other, led to further isolation of
Morocco in the region. Morocco was blamed for being an impediment to
Maghrebi integration because of its intransigence over Western Sahara.
Algerians argued that a settlement of the conflict based on the principles laid
down by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity resolutions would constitute a great step toward Maghrebi unity.'
While an
appeal was made to Morocco to move in that direction, Algerian
policymakers continued to insist that the right to self-determination could only
be realized through direct negotiations between the Kingdom of Morocco and
POLISARIO in order to institute a cease-fire and to organize a free and
regular referendum under OAU and U.N. auspices, without any military or
administrative constraints.
In late 1986 and Spring 1987, Morocco was close to finishing the last
defensive wall. Algeria viewed with concern the expansion and completion
on April 16, 1987 of the sixth wall because it came so near the border with
Mauritania, Algeria's powerless ally.'
Concerned over possible tension
between Morocco and Algeria, and with events in the Near East and the Gulf
region, Saudi King Fahd mediated a second meeting between Bendjedid and
Hassan II. The gathering took place in the presence of King Fahd himself on
May 4, 1987 in the Algerian-Moroccan border-town Akid Lotfi. 1' Although the meeting eased tension between the two countries, both sides
remained apart as far as conflict in the Western Sahara was concerned. But,
due to the King's interest in coming out of his isolation and adhering to the
ongoing process of regional integration, the momentum was continued

128. See Jonathan C. Randal, Hassan, Peres Start Talks in Morocco, WASH. POST, July 23,
1986, at Al.
129. Id; BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 187, 265.
130. Morocco Cancelling Treaty Aimed at Union With Libya, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1986,
at 3.
131. BERRAMDANE, supra note 21, at 223.

132. Yahia H. Zoubir, Origins and Development of the Western Sahara Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Origins and Development]. See
also Rencontre Hassan I-Mitterrand,JEUNE AFRIQUE, May 6, 1987, at 17-18; Peter Blackburn,
Concern Grows that Mauritania Will be Drawn into Neighbor's War, CHRIST. SCI. MON., June

9, 1987, at 27.
133. Jonathan C. Randal, Algerian, Moroccan Leaders Meet, WASH. POST, May 5, 1987,

at A21.
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throughout the year. An exchange of Moroccan and Algerian prisoners held
since the two deadly battles of Amgala in 1976 took place immediately after
the meeting of the two heads of states. 3 4 There is no doubt that the Saudi
role was instrumental in inducing Morocco to seek a negotiated settlement of
the conflict. There was increasing evidence that the Saudis, who were paying
approximately one billion dollars a year to help the king wage his war in
Western Sahara,' would use their financial leverage to bring Hassan II to
their direction.
The good atmosphere that surrounded the talks in Akid Lotfi could not
hide the deep disagreements regarding the Western Sahara conflict. The
Sahrawis continued their periodic attacks against the walls and insisted that
direct negotiations with the Moroccans must be held before international
observers could be sent to the area.' 3 6 They also maintained that occupying
troops should be withdrawn during the holding of the referendum in order to
guarantee a free consultation.'" The Moroccans, who were eager to soften
Algeria's position on Western Sahara and to be part of the process of
integration, made appeasing statements, such as the one by Hassan II himself:
"If the Sahrawis decide to integrate with Morocco, they would be most
welcome. If they decide to secede [sic], we would be the first ones to open
an embassy in their capital."' 3 8 Feeling that this was a constructive approach, the Sahrawi leaders were hopeful that the integration process
underway would include them and that a possible solution would be found
within that framework.' 39 Successive events have shown this to be a rather
naive assessment of the King's policy, for Hassan II has never considered the
possibility of relinquishing Western Sahara. Morocco has never had any
intention of allowing the holding of the referendum decided upon by the
United Nations, and agreed to by Morocco, unless it was sure to win.
In order to avoid being isolated in the region, Morocco began to readjust
its diplomacy to regional realities. One of the King's major "concessions" in
the summer of 1987 was his statement, just before his trip to England, that
conflict in the Western Sahara was between Morocco and POLISARIO and
not with Algeria as he had hitherto claimed. 140 This recognition did indeed
mark a departure from his earlier position which blamed Algeria for the war
and which described the Sahrawis as "mercenaries" created by Morocco's
eastern neighbor.' 4' The continuous dialogue between Algeria and Morocco

134. BALTA, supra note 19, at 234.
135. Daniel Volman, The Role of Foreign Military Assistance in the Western Sahara War,
in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 151, 155-56.
136. BALTA, supra note 19, at 234.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Interview with a high-ranking POLISARIO official in New York (1989). See also Le
Polisarioouvre le feu sur.. le rifirendum, JEUNE AFRIQUE, July 29, 1987, at 34.
140. BALTA, supra note 19, at 235.
141. Origins and Development, supra note 132, at 7.
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led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations on May 16, 1988."' For
Algerians, the re-establishment of these ties was aimed at correcting an
anomalous situation. Morocco, in contrast, decided to renew diplomatic
relations with Algeria not only to break the kingdom's isolation on the
Maghrebi and African scene, but also to isolate the Sahrawis, whose cause
King Hassan hoped would be sacrificed on the altar of Maghrebi integration.
Some observers believed that the construction of the greater Maghreb had
taken precedence over the question of Western Sahara.'4 3 From a Moroccan point of view, Algeria's rapprochement with Morocco meant that
Morocco now had no need to negotiate with the Sahrawis, for Algeria was
allegedly abandoning its "client."
Sahrawi leaders were initially quite nervous about the turn of events.' 44
But their reaction, after receiving assurances from the Algerians, was positive
because they hoped that renewed diplomatic relations and better rapport
between Algeria and Morocco would compel Hassan II to seek a political
solution.'4 5 In fact, the Algerian-Moroccan joint communiqu6 was clear as
to the necessity of a political settlement of the conflict:
[E]ager to promote the success of international efforts undertaken to hasten
the process of good offices for a just and definitive solution to the Western
Sahara conflict through a free and regular referendum for self-determination
held without any constraints whatsoever and with utmost sincerity... [the
two countries] have decided to reestablish diplomatic relations. 6
Due to the seeming divisions within the Algerian regime regarding the issue,
many observers and diplomats speculated about a "fix" between Algeria and
Morocco concerning Western Sahara, whereby a face-saving formula would
be agreed upon to make the Sahrawi territory an autonomous region of
Morocco. This scenario was played up following King Hassan's interview
with the French daily, Le Monde, published on August 3, 1988. According
to the King's formula, the Sahrawis would be granted autonomy if they
decided to remain Moroccan. At the same time, he made it very clear that

142. EL MouJAH1D (Algiers), May 17, 1988. See also Algeria to Resume Ties with
Morocco, N.Y. TIMEs, May 17, 1988, at All.
143. Interviews with Western and U.S. Diplomats in Washington, D.C. (Summer 1988).
144. POLISARIO issued a communiqud six hours after Algeria and Morocco announced the
resumption of diplomatic relations, reaffirming that a solution to the Western Sahara conflict
could only be had through a referendum, and claiming that its guerrillas had attacked a Moroccan
outpost near the Mauritanian border, killing ten Moroccan soldiers, Polisario Reports Fresh
Attack as Morocco-Algeria Resume Ties, REUTERs, May 17, 1988, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ARCNWS file. Morocco denied that such an attack ever occurred. Saharan Guerrillas
Say They Attacked Morocco, Rabat Denies It, REUTERS, May 18, 1988, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ARCNWS file.
145. Accord Reached, AFRICA NEWS, May 30, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS file.
146. EL MOUDJAHID (Algiers), May 17, 1988 (translation mine). See also Agreeing to
Agree, AFRICA NEWS, May 30, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
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he was totally opposed to Sahrawi independence. 47 In other words, there
would be no negotiation on this issue. All the Sahrawis could expect was
some sort of vague autonomy under full Moroccan sovereignty. The door to
genuine negotiations with the Sahrawis was basically closed. There is no
doubt that Algeria's attempt to build a united Maghreb without excluding
Morocco, and its failure to include the SADR in the process convinced
Morocco that negotiating with the Sahrawis was pointless, for the major
supporter of the cause was showing signs of weakness. But, at the same
time, Morocco had to give the impression that it was seeking a political
solution. Thus, in July 1988, once again through Saudi mediation, secret
talks between Sahrawis and Moroccans were held in Ta~f, Saudi Arabia.'
The problem, though, is that they were conducted at a very low level.
According to a POLISARIO official, the Moroccans had promised that a
member of the royal family would meet with the Sahrawi "Elders"
(Shuyukhs). "A member of the [Moroccan] royal family did come; he said:
'you are meeting, that's good!' Then he left."' 49 Unquestionably, the main
Moroccan objective was to avoid embarrassing the Algerians by creating the
illusion that a peace process was underway and that Morocco was fulfilling
the pledge it made as a precondition for the renewal of diplomatic relations
with Algeria.
As indicated earlier, Morocco's analysis of Algeria was based on the
perception that there existed divisions within the Algerian leadership between
radical and moderate factions. The radical faction was pro-Sahrawi and was
thought to be inflexible on the question. It was also opposed to better ties
with Morocco. The moderate or liberal faction, represented by President
Bendjedid, was believed to be more sympathetic to Morocco's claims. The
Moroccans believed that all this faction needed was a face-saving solution to
abandon all support for POLISARIO. In effect, if there was a face-saving
solution, it came from the United Nations on August 11, 1988, when
Secretary-General Javier P6rez de Cu6llar proposed a peace plan to the parties
in conflict, Morocco and the Sahrawis."50 The plan offered, among other
things, a cease-fire and a referendum that would allow the Sahrawis to
exercise their right to self-determination.'' The two parties accepted the
peace proposal, albeit with reservations."' The acceptance of and commitment to the peace proposal, however, did not mean an end to the conflict.
In September 1988, POLISARIO armed forces launched several attacks

147. Un entretien avec Hassan II, LE MONDE, Aug. 3, 1988, at 1.
148. Frances Ghiles, Polisario Weighs Up War and Compromise with Hassan, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 13, 1988, at 5.
149. Interview in Geneva (Mar. 23, 1994).
150. Ted Morello, UN. Leader Offers Plan on Western Sahara, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,
1988, at A23.
151. Id.
152. Paul Lewis, Sahara Foes Move to End Their War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1988, at A7.
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against Moroccan positions.'
Their objective was clearly to demonstrate
that POLISARIO was an independent force to be reckoned with and that
Moroccan dialogue, if not negotiations, with POLISARIO was as important
as with Algiers. Therefore, from POLISARIO's point of view, direct
negotiations were a necessary condition for a genuine peace process.
Although they rejected POLISARIO's view on direct negotiations, Moroccans
came to accept their opponent as a reality. They no longer blamed Algeria
for POLISARIO attacks on Morocco.
Even though there might have been divisions within Algeria's leadership
on the Western Sahara issue, it is clear that those who allegedly sought to
abandon POLISARIO failed to gain the upper hand, for POLISARIO's
attacks on Moroccan positions would not have been possible without at least
tacit approval from Algeria. Against mounting speculations about Algeria's
new attitude toward POLISARIO, President Bendjedid made reference to the
issue in an important speech-against the so-called radicals opposed to his
domestic liberal reforms-given on September 19, 1988:
We have been clear [with the Moroccans] from the beginning. In no way
will Algeria ever renounce her fundamental principles regarding the defense
ofjust causes and peoples' right to self-determination. This was understood
by our 5Moroccan
brothers. We believe that the Sahrawi question is a just
4
cause. 1

Yet, despite these statements and POLISARIO attacks, Moroccans still
believed that negotiations were unnecessary and that sooner or later the
Sahrawi cause would die a natural death. This is why they thought that the
mere acceptance of holding a referendum in Western Sahara would satisfy
Algeria's leaders and would make it easier for its neighbor to eventually drop
the issue altogether. This also explains why Moroccan officials, although
they accepted the principle of a referendum, continued to insist that Western
Sahara would remain Moroccan and that the referendum was simply a
"procedure and an episode."
V. ALGERIA'S INTERNAL TURMOIL AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

In October 1988, a series of violent urban disturbances erupted throughout Algeria.'
King Hassan decided to extend support to Algeria's presi-

153. Edward Cody, W. Sahara War Nears an End; Morocco, Guerrillas Agree to Peace
Plan, WASH. POST., Sept. 25, 1988, at Al.

154. EL MOUDJAHID (Algiers), Sept. 21, 1988 (translation mine).
155. See, e.g., F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., Oct. 5-12, 1988. On the causes of unrest in Algeria in 1988,
see Michael Ross, State of Siege Over-But Algeria Still Viewed as "a Social Tinderbox" L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1988, at 10. See also Yahia H. Zoubir, Stalled Democratization of an
Authoritarian Regime:

The Case of Algeria, 2 DEMOCRATIZATION

109 (1995); Robert A.

Mortimer, Algeria After the Explosion, 89 CURRENT HIST. 161 (1990).
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dent' 56 because, unlike his predecessor, Houari Boum~di~ne, Bendjedid was
perceived as "a good man ... having no personal ambitions and desirous to
live in peace with us." During the same period, Algerians maintained their
position on the Western Sahara issue and insisted on the necessity for direct
negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO and reiterated their call for
a referendum which should take place under conditions that precluded
Moroccan administrative and military intimidation. In the same month, the
United Nations Fourth Committee on Decolonization had voted overwhelmingly in favor of Resolution 43/33 which called for direct negotiations
between POLISARIO and Morocco as the best avenue for bringing about a
cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination for the people of Western Sahara without any
administrative or military constraints under the auspices of the Organization
of African Unity and the United Nations.15 7 However, the Moroccans felt
that there was even less need for direct negotiations now because of the
mediation provided by the U.N. Secretary-General. The King himself
continued to display his seemingly contradictory discourse on the Western
Sahara:
We are about to embark on a referendum and I know best the atmosphere
surrounding this referendum . . . I say to those [i.e., the Sahrawis] who
went astray and lost their way that they should fear God for the sake of the
homeland and kinship. They should realize that the referendum on which
we embark with all our determination and strength and our belief in our
right will only enhance the right that has already been confirmedfor years
and centuries.15
Following this provocative statement, King Hassan made a tactical, highly
publicized move whose aim was to serve several functions. In December
1988, the King declared to the French media that he would agree to a
meeting with Sahrawi nationalists, including representatives of
POLISARIO. 5 9 But, again, a close analysis of the language used by the
King demonstrates his total-albeit consistent-opposition to genuine
negotiation:
Question:

You have agreed to the holding of a referendum in the
[Western] Sahara. Would you give up this territory if you

156. Bendjedid Receives Messages, F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., Oct. 12, 1988, at 12.
157. U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 43d Sess., Agenda Item 18, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/43/L.2 (1988).
See also G.A. Res. 33, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 236-37, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988).
158. King Hassan II Addresses Green March Anniversary, F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., Nov. 7, 1988,
at 15 (emphasis added).
159. Hassan H au Polisario: "Les portes de mon palais sont ouvertes," LE POINT, Dec. 12,
1988, at 43 [hereinafter "Les portes de mon palais"]. In English, see Paul Delaney, Hassan of
Morocco Agrees to Talk with Western Saharan Guerrillas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1988, at AI.
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lost?
Answer:

If the outcome is negative, Morocco will draw the necessary
consequences.

Question:

Wouldn't it be preferable that there be agreement between the
two parties?

Answer:

I have always wished that because this referendum would be
painful. Families are split in two. This is why I have reached
out to those [i.e., Sahrawis] on the other side [i.e., in Algeria].
I have said and I repeat: "the doors of my palace are open."
I am ready to listen to everyone, to hear their grievances and
to know their wishes for this part of the territory [Western
Sahara]. I will guarantee everyone's safe passage. I am
willing to discuss, but not to negotiate.

Question:

Are you willing to meet with them if they come as Moroccan
subjects?

Answer:

Not even, not even. They can come as POLISARIO, but they
must come to me.

Question:

Is a Sahrawi State conceivable?

Answer:

Nobody talks about independence anymore. That
would be a
60
cancer for Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco.

The tactical nature of this statement is unmistakable. Yet a determination of
the reasons which motivated the King to make such a decision is critical.
There are at least five considerations which have impelled the King to agree
to meet with POLISARIO officials. First, the King may have been convinced
that the value of the new relationship with Algeria was worth a small
"concession," not least because the Maghrebi summit scheduled to take place
in February 1989 in the Kingdom of Morocco would be jeopardized unless
Algeria's demand for direct talks between Morocco and POLISARIO was
accepted. Second, Rabat's categorical refusal to comply with U.N. and OAU
resolutions was upsetting to many governments. Third, French President,
Frangois Mitterrand had pleaded with the King during the Franco-African
summit held a month earlier to speed up the "peace process." Fourth, the
United States had also shown increasing interest in seeking a settlement that
would promote stability in the region. Fifth, the King was hopeful that he
might be able to divide the Sahrawi leaders who were becoming increasingly
weary as a result of many years of struggle and would thus be more amenable
to a compromise with Morocco.

160. "Les portes de mon palais", supra note 159, at 43 (emphasis added).
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VI. POLISARIO's MEETING WITH KING HASSAN 161
The two meetings held between King Hassan and the three POLISARIO
representatives on January 4 and 5, 1989, were the most promising of all
encounters between Moroccans and Sahrawis.' 6' The importance of these
meetings stemmed from the fact that the King himself-and he was the only
"negotiator"--chaired the meeting. This fact was also important because he
alone and no one else in Morocco can make any consequential decision on
Western Sahara.
POLISARIO leaders welcomed the direct talks with King Hassan which,
they claimed, would lead to "the active phase" of the peace process and allow
the two sides to "move on, hand in hand, to a free and fair referendum on
self-determination among the people of the Western Sahara.' ' 163 The
Sahrawi delegation was composed of three top officials: Bachir Mustapha
Sayed, Mahfoud Ali Befba, and Brahim Ghali. They carried with them a
letter written by the SADR's President Mohamed Abdelaziz on the SADR's
stationary in which he asserted that the three were mandated to negotiate as
plenipotentiaries. The three were accompanied to the doorsteps by the
King's closest cabinet members, Abdellatif Filali, Driss Basri, and Ahmed
R6da Guedira. The three Moroccan officials then sat in the waiting room
until the meeting between the King and the POLISARIO representatives
ended. This occurred twice, with the only difference that another Moroccan
official, Karim Lamrani, accompanied the Sahrawi delegation to the
doorsteps. The King is said to have told the delegation: "I know you
Sahrawis, you don't like constraints. Despite all the investments I have made
in the Territory, I haven't succeeded in winning your hearts. There has been
too much bloodshed, we need to put an end to this conflict." Although the
Sahrawis have reported only bits from the talks they held with the King, they
reported that Hassan II was very concerned about his succession and that he
did not want to leave a "time bomb" for his son, the crown prince. Despite
Morocco's insistence that the King "only talked" with the Sahrawi representatives, the substance of their discussions could well be described as quasinegotiation--or perhaps prenegotiation-since not only were the details of the
referendum raised, but also arrangements for a truce and an exchange of
prisoners. Contrary to some reports, there was no agreement on autonomy
under Moroccan sovereignty. What is certain is that the King promised that

161. This part is reconstituted from various discussions held in 1989 and in 1994 with
POLISARIO officials, including SADR's president, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and one of the three
members and principal negotiator, Bachir Mustapha Sayed, who met with King Hassan in
February 1989.
162. Jonathan Clayton, Morocco and Polisario Plan More Meetings After Breaking ice,
REUTERS, Jan. 5, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
163. ALGRIE PRESSE SERVICE, Jan. 9, 1989. See also Polisario Official Optimistic about
Marrakesh Talks with King Hassan, BBC

SUMMARY OF

WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 12, 1989,

available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file (interview with Malainine Ould Seddik,
member of the Polisario Front Political Bureau).
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he would meet again with the Sahrawis.
The King's immediate objective in agreeing to hold the talks with the
Sahrawis was to appease the Algerians and to guarantee the success of the
upcoming Maghrebi Summit. The fervor over Maghrebi unity led to a tacit
agreement between Algeria and Morocco to leave aside the Sahrawi question.
From the Algerian perspective, this was not a concession because the U.N.
was in charge of the dossier.
Having achieved his objective, King Hassan exploited the regional
developments to his own benefit by stating very bluntly that he had never met
with Sahrawi nationalists, but "it is Moroccans who have gone astray that I
met in the hope that they would be put back on the right path. Never were
they received as members of the so-called POLISARIO.' '

64

Following his

meeting with the Sahrawis, King Hassan admitted that he should have met
with them earlier. 65 At the same time, he insisted that Western Sahara is
Moroccan territory. He argued that the referendum would be "bothersome"
even to POLISARIO-the implication being that the result was a foregone
conclusion-and that he had agreed that it should be held only to avoid
having Morocco be put on the defensive and accused of expansionism. Once
again, he reiterated his promise to the Sahrawi nationalists that "when they
have reintegrated their homeland [sic], they would benefit, like the other
Moroccan
provinces, from the regionalization plan which has been envis, 166
aged."

The King's attitude was predicated upon both domestic and international
considerations. On the domestic front, assuming there was a willingness to
resolve the conflict politically regardless of the outcome of the referendum,
Hassan still had to face the opposition parties-who often, for tactical
reasons, take an uncompromising position on the question-and the military.
Both would use the issue as a lever to extract corporatist demands from the
Palace. Hassan's decision not to involve any members of his Cabinet in the
talks with POLISARIO indicates not only that solving the Western Sahara
issue is his own affair, but also that he wants to use it for political ends. In
order to prevent the opposition from raising any doubts as to his determination to keep the Territory, the King declared immediately after his meeting
with the three Sahrawi nationalists that Morocco "has not given an inch of
ground."' 67 Externally, the King perhaps hoped that Algeria would help
him find a face-saving formula. By reestablishing and consolidating relations
with Algeria, feigning to begin negotiations with the Sahrawis, and excluding
the issue from the bilateral ties with Algeria, the King succeeded in forcing

164. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 16, 1989. Cf Yehuda Litani, The King and the Intifada,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
165. Le roi Hassan II invite le Polisario 6 "bineficier du plan de rdgionalisation," LE
MONDE, Jan. 13, 1989, at 3.
166. Id.
167. Franqois Soudan, Hassan ll/Polisario:les secrets d'une rencontre, JEUNE AFRIQUE, Jan.
25, 1989, at 34.
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the Maghrebi States to put the Sahrawi issue on the back burner.
King Hassan's unwillingness to renew talks with the Sahrawis provoked
POLISARIO in March 1989 to end the unilateral cease-fire it had declared
for the whole of February as a goodwill gesture. 68 However, it was in that
very month that the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) between Algeria,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia had been inaugurated at their
summit meeting in Marrakech after more than three decades of pan-Maghreb
rhetoric. 169 In so far as the King had achieved his goal of securing the
creation of the UMA without the participation of the SADR, it began to
appear as if the Sahrawi state might become sufficiently ignored and isolated
as to die what the Moroccans hoped would be a natural death. This explains
why Morocco reneged on the pursuit of negotiations as the best avenue for
achieving a solution. For instance, on September 1, 1989, King Hassan
promised President Bendjedid that he would hold a new round of talks with
POLISARIO before his forthcoming trip to Spain, only to declare bluntly
three weeks later that this was unnecessary, for "there is nothing to negotiate
because the Western Sahara is Moroccan territory." 7 ' What is rather ironic
is that consistent denials by Moroccans that they had ever agreed to a second
round of talks with POLISARIO did not stop them from arguing that the
Sahrawis' continued military operations had put an end to the "planned
meeting."''
This only confirmed Moroccan opposition to direct negotiations and revealed their promises to hold such negotiations as mere tactical
maneuvers. In fact, when, in the summer of 1990, the SADR's president,
Mohamed Abdelaziz, announced that direct talks were soon to be held, the
Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri denied the statement, arguing
that U.N. Secretary-General Pdrez de Cu~llar had been asked to use his good
offices in order to conduct indirect negotiations between the interested parties
in an attempt to find the best means to hold a referendum. 7
VII. THE U.N. PEACE PLAN: PEACEMAKING OR WARMAKING?

The peace plan proposed by the Secretary-General and accepted "in
principle" by both sides to the conflict-although it offered no timetable as
to the dates of its implementation-constituted the basis upon which the
referendum was to take place. It was rather surprising that Morocco accepted
it, for the latter had, up to that time, been reluctant to view POLISARIO as

168. No New Talks, AFRICA NEws, Apr. 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library
ARCNWS file.
169. North Africa: Five Heads of State Launch Arab Maghreb Union, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Feb. 17, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
170. Morocco's Discomfiture, WEST AFRICA, Oct. 2-8, 1989, at 1666.
171. Expected Meeting in Rabat Aborted by Polisario Attack, AL SHARQ AL AWSAT
(London), Oct. 10, 1989 (original in Arabic).
172. Morocco Denies It Will Talk to Polisario Guerrillas,REUTERS, July 4, 1990, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
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an independent party to the conflict. There is no doubt that the King
accepted the peace plan because he knew that the ambiguities in the plan
could help him give it his own interpretation and force POLISARIO and the
U.N. to adjust to his own understanding of the plan. The main reason he
agreed to it was also determined by the cost of the war which was becoming
increasingly unbearable for the Moroccan economy.' 73 Further, the fact that
more than seventy states had recognized the SADR could not leave the King
oblivious to such a reality. No country, no matter how close to Morocco,
endorsed the latter's claim over the Territory-at least not publicly. The
mood in the U.N. was favorable to adopting and eventually implementing the
OAU's proposals for resolving the dispute. For its part, POLISARIO, despite
its many military successes, could not hope to bring Morocco to the table by
defeating the estimated 120,000-150,000 Moroccan troops entrenched in
Western Sahara. The prospect of direct talks--especially after the secret
contacts in Taf--coupled with the resumption of Algerian-Moroccan ties,
compelled POLISARIO to also subscribe to the Secretary-General's peace
plan. Sahrawi officials who had constantly urged Morocco to negotiate hoped
that the contacts in Tadf and the resumption of Morocco's ties with Algeria,
POLISARIO's main benefactor, were a sign that the King may have altered
his position on direct talks.' 74 As later events will demonstrate, this
assessment was totally groundless.
In June 1990, the U.N. Secretary-General introduced an elaborate plan
for the factual transition of the former Spanish colony to either independence
or internationally sanctioned integration to Morocco. The plan included the
modalities of a cease-fire, phased troop withdrawal, repatriation of refugees,
the exercise of transitional authority, a timetable for the process, the mandate
of the Identification Commission to screen eligible voters, the role of the
Special Representative, etc.' 75 The U.N. Security Council unanimously
approved the Secretary-General's undertaking and called on both Morocco
and POLISARIO to "co-operate fully" with him.' 76
Strengthened by his mandate, P6rez de Cu61lar traveled to Geneva in the
same month in the hope of convening the two parties and persuading the
Moroccans to hold direct talks with the Sahrawi nationalists. On July 5,
1990, he declared that there would, indeed, be a direct meeting between the
Moroccan government and a delegation of the POLISARIO Front.' 77 De
Cu6llar was, no doubt, hopeful that the meeting he had just succeeded in
arranging between the Iranians and the Iraqis would have a spill over effect.

173. See Low-Intensity Intervention, supra note 99, at 70-72 (discussing the impact of the
escalating cost of the war on the Moroccan political economy).
174. Interview with Sahrawi Officials (1990).
175. The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., at 14-17, U.N. Doc. S/21360 (1990).
176. S.C. Res. 658, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. No. S/Res/658 (1990).
177. Claude Regin, UN. Chief Determined to Host Direct Polisario-Morocco Talks,
REUTERS, July 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
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But, despite five days of intensive efforts, the Secretary-General failed to
convince the Moroccan side to meet and negotiate with POLISARIO officials
under U.N. auspices. Another opportunity to build upon the potential
momentum created by the January 1989 meeting was thus missed. Nevertheless, thirty-eight tribal elders, nineteen from Al Ayoun (under Moroccan
control) and nineteen from Tindouf and the liberated sections of the Territory
(under POLISARIO authority) gathered to examine the census rolls.' The
Elders were seemingly members of the tribal council (djemaa), which existed
under Spanish colonial rule. Even in this meeting, a controversy arose as to
the exact identity of one of the Elders whom POLISARIO accused of being
a member of the Moroccan interior ministry. 7 9 Indirect talks did, however,
take place whereby the two sides agreed on the question to be asked in the
referendum: independence or integration with Morocco. They also concurred
on who should be allowed to vote, namely, those whose names figured in the
1974 Spanish census.
The plan stipulates that the Identification
Commission's task was to "implement the agreed position of the parties that
all Western Saharans counted in the 1974 census undertaken by the Spanish
authorities and aged eighteen or over will have the right to vote, whether
currently 0present in the Territory or outside as refugees or for other
18
reasons."'
There were also pending problems regarding the presence during the vote
of the tens of thousands of Moroccan troops and administrators in the
Territory. The Secretary-General was, however, hopeful that these problems
would be solved through his own negotiations with the Moroccan authorities.
The U.N. operation as a whole was named MINURSO, the French acronym
for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara.
It was composed of 375 members (military and medical personnel) whose
task was to supervise a referendum"' in a territory the size of Colorado, or
half the size of France.
In 1991, in an effort to update certain administrative aspects of his plan,
Pdrez de Cu6llar introduced elements which were exploited by Morocco to
add new voters favorable to Morocco, thus stalling the peace process
altogether. In paragraph 20 on the identification and registration of voters,
the Secretary-General declared that,
The [Identification] Commission's mandate to update the 1974 census will
include (a) removing from the lists the names of persons who have since
died and (b) considering applications from persons who claim the right to
participate in the referendum on the grounds that they are Western Saharans

178. Western Sahara: One Last Colony, THE

ECONOMIST,

July 14, 1990, at 41.

179. Id.
180. The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/21360 (1990).
181. Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Missionfor the Referendum in
Western Sahara, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23662 (1992).
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and were omitted from the 1974 census.

Clause (b) of this paragraph offered King Hassan a golden opportunity
to turn the referendum to his own advantage. In August 1991, he submitted
a list of 120,000 additional voters to the 1974 census.' 83 Morocco then
began moving 170,000 individuals, claiming they were Sahrawis, into
Western Sahara. 8 4 This has been referred to as the second "Green
March."'8 5 This constituted such a violation of the peace plan that
Johannes Manz, the Secretary-General's representative, a Swiss high-ranking
civil servant known for his competence and high integrity, resigned from his
position in December 1991.86 In a "personal and confidential" letter he
wrote to P6rez de Cu61lar on December 13, 1991, he made a number of
recommendations. In one of them, Manz insisted that the U.N. propose "an
agreement which both Parties can accept, even in defeat. Such an agreement
can only be sought and reached at the negotiating table, based on a model
which would guarantee an outcome with neither a clear winner nor a clear
This was one of the most realistic formulations, which
loser."' 87
POLISARIO and the international community could easily accept. More
importantly, Johannes Manz sought to avoid complicating the peace process
by showing a firm U.N. position on the military violations of the cease-fire
established since September 6, 1991. Most of the military violations were
Morocco's. It had also committed non-military violations. Regarding the
latter, Manz stated:
Concerning the non-military violations, the movement of unidentified
persons into the Territory, the so called 'Second Green March,' constitutes,
in my view, a breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Peace Plan. It
was, therefore, with great sadness that I took note of the contents of your
letter on this subject to the King of Morocco dated November 18, which
although I had
was sent without my prior consultation or my knowledge,
made very clear recommendations on this matter.' 8
Instead of pursuing Manz's recommendations, P6rez de Cu6lar
succumbed to Morocco's increasing demands for the inclusion of additional
voters. On December 19, 1991, less than two weeks before his term in office

182. The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., para. 20, U.N. Doc. S/22464 (1991).
183. Francis Ghiles, Fears over UN's Saharan Peace Deal, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 6,
1991, at 4.
184. Id.
185. Sahara Polisario Accuses Morocco of Planning New Green March, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
186. UN. 's Special Western Sahara Envoy to Switch Jobs, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec.
19, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
187. Confidential letter from Johannes Manz to Javier Pdrez de Cudllar, Secretary General
of the United Nations (Dec. 13, 1991) (on file with the author).
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was due to expire, Pdrez de Cullar submitted a final report on the question. "89
' In part VII of the annex to the report he recommended, in essence,
that eligibility be extended to include people who can show they had resided
in the Western Sahara continuously for a period of six years before December
1974 or who had lived there intermittently over a period of twelve years
before Spain's withdrawal. Johannes Manz resigned the following day. On
December 31, the U.N. Security Council refused to endorse the SecretaryGeneral's report. Although France attempted to convince members of the
council to endorse P6rez de Cu6llar's proposals, the United States was
unwilling to accept them. Instead of endorsing this report, the Security
Council adopted a resolution on December 31, 1991, the last day of the
Secretary-General's term in office, stating that the council "approves" his
efforts but only "welcomes" the text of the proposal.'
The Security
Council correctly understood that de Cu6llar's report not only ran against the
efforts of the Identification Commission, but was undoubtedly a unilateral
modification of the original peace plan and represented the will of only one
side to the conflict (Morocco) to the detriment of POLISARIO and even the
co-sponsor of the peace plan, the OAU. Therefore, the Council's resolution
meant that the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, would have to
develop a proposal on voter eligibility acceptable to both sides.
There is no doubt that at that stage, the process had already been
undermined. The French had supported P6rez de Cu6llar's proposals as a
means to finish up with the Western Sahara question and to strengthen
Morocco's stability at a time when the legislative elections in Algeria were
favorable to the Islamists. The prospect of an Islamist victory, from a French
perspective, would have created a period of great instability in Algeria. The
risk of a spill over into Morocco being almost certain, it became logical for
the French to strengthen the Moroccan monarchy by offering it a victory in
Western Sahara, thus consolidating the King's legitimacy and at the same
time allegedly creating a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
It must be pointed out at the onset, from an objective point of view, that
the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan (who was eventually replaced by Erik Jensen),
have, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, acted in such a way as to
be interpreted by many as an attempt to align the U.N. position with the
Moroccan stance.'
Ever since they took office, they seem to have
progressively favored one side to the conflict at the expense of the other.
POLISARIO, in particular, has emphasized the absence of objectivity in this

189. Report of the Secretary-GeneralConcerning the Situation in the Western Sahara, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23299 (1991).
190. S.C. Res. 725, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/725 (1991).
191. See Yahia H. Zoubir & Anthony G. Pazzanita, The United Nations' Failure in
Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict, 49 MIDDLE EAST J. 614, 620-27 (1995).
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protracted conflict.' 92 Indeed, some of the actions of the Secretary General
and his Special Representative may explain why Morocco has not found it in
its interest to enter any serious negotiations with POLISARIO.
In November 1992, a scheduled meeting of tribal chiefs in Geneva failed
to convene. On January 26, 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued his update
report on the situation concerning the Western Sahara. After outlining the
major areas of contention between the two parties regarding the eligibility
criteria, the Secretary-General presented three broad options as possible ways
of resolving the dispute:
(a) Continuation, and if possible, intensification of talks. It is my
considered opinion, however, that the chances for success under this option
are very slim;
(b) Immediate implementation of the settlement plan on the basis of the
instructions for the review of applications for participation in the referendum appearing in the annex to my predecessor's report of 19 December
1991 (S/23299). This may mean that the implementation would have to
proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties;
(c) A third option would be to adopt an alternative approach not based on

the settlement plan.' 93

With France's backing, Boutros-Ghali was hopeful that option (b) would
be adopted as a U.N. Security Council resolution. The United States'
preference for option (a), with draft propositions by Spain and New Zealand,
led to the adoption on March 2, 1993 of U.N. Security Council Resolution
809, which stressed the necessity of ensuring the full cooperation of both
parties for the implementation of the Settlement Plan, invited "the SecretaryGeneral and his special representative to intensify their efforts, with the
parties, in order to resolve the issues .

in particular those relating to the

interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility.' 9 4 It also
invited the Secretary-General "to make the necessary preparations for the
organization of the referendum of self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara and to consult accordingly with the parties for the purpose of
commencing voter registration on a prompt basis starting with the updated
lists of the 1974 census."' 95

The report was followed in June by a tour of the region by BoutrosGhali. During his talks with the belligerents, he proposed a "compromise"
regarding the criteria for eligibility, which in fact was little more than to
repeat the criteria of his predecessor and the ones he had himself already

192. Id.
193. The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara. Report by the Secretary-General,U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/25170 (1993).
194. S.C. Res. 809, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/809 (1993).
195. Id.
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proposed in his previous reports.' 96
U.N. Security Council Resolution 809 had the merit of encouraging
negotiations. The idea of direct talks gained more ground and seemed to be
accepted by both parties. By mid-July, direct talks, under U.N. auspices,
were held in the Sahrawi capital of Al Ayoun.' 97 Behind the scenes, the
United States had used its weight to induce Morocco to participate in the
upcoming "historic" event and Algeria had encouraged POLISARIO to be
forthcoming. The POLISARIO negotiating team was composed of eleven
representatives, six of whom occupied important positions in the POLISARIO
and SADR structures. The U.N. was reassured that the Moroccan delegation
would be headed by Ahmed Senoussi, the King's U.N. representative in New
York and by Mohamed Azmi from the ministry of the interior. The objective
of the meeting, as contained in the letter sent by the Secretary-General to the
negotiators, was to overcome the differences on the criteria for identifying the
electoral body. The talks, however, ended in failure because the two
protagonists came with totally different agendas.
The POLISARIO
representatives came to the meeting in the hope of negotiating in order to
break the deadlock and speed up the process for the holding of a referendum.
The Moroccans maintained their approach: in order to avoid giving any
legitimacy to POLISARIO, no Moroccan official would be mandated to
negotiate. Ahmed Senoussi did not direct the discussions. The leading
"negotiator" in the Moroccan delegation was a Sahrawi, Biyadillah Ould
Mohamed Cheikh, who had made allegiance to the Moroccans." g When
Senoussi received the POLISARIO delegation in AI-Ayoun, he told the
representatives in a paternalistic tone: "You are our sons and you are here in
your country."' 99 He also told them that since the peace plan "is locked up
in the
Secretary-General's safe in New York, we are not here to discuss
20 0
it."

During the fourth meeting of the two delegations, the Moroccans read the
King's message which stated that "all Saharans are his sons and that none of
them are disobedient as he expresses the hope that anyone who has gone
astray will return to the right path., 20 1 He repeated his proposal for
autonomy within the framework of Morocco's regionalization. He asked the
Sahrawis "to contribute any vision, idea, suggestion, or whatever you deem
appropriate, to the development of this region within Moroccan sovereignty
20 2
and territorial integrity.,

196. King Hassan, UN. Envoy Discuss Western Sahara, REUTER LIBRARY REP., June 7,
1993, available in LEXIS News Library, ARCNWS file.
197. Ali Bouzerda, Western Sahara Foes Meet for First Direct Talks, REUTER LIBRARY
REP., July 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
198. Le Malentendu de Laayoun, JEUNE AFRIQUE, July 29-Aug. 4, 1993, at 11.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. King Hassan Message on Talks with Polisario,F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., July 21, 1993, at 18.
202. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol26/iss2/2

36

Zoubir: The Western Sahara
A Case
StudyCONFLICT
in Failure of Prenegoti
1996]
THE Conflict:
WESTERN
SAHARA

This and other statements are a clear demonstration that the Moroccan
side has no intention of negotiating with the Sahrawis. The July meeting was
not a case of "getting to the table" to begin negotiation or even prenegotiation, but rather, as bluntly put by the head of the Moroccan delegation:
From the beginning, it was out of the question to discuss the
procedures for implementing the referendum on self-determination, which
remain under the authority of the U.N. Secretary-General alone.
Therefore anything that comes under the authority of the UN
secretary general or of his special representative cannot be discussed in our
meetings. Definitely, this was not what our Saharan brothers of the
Polisario thought....
The issue was connected with informing our brothers that the
Moroccan character of the Sahara cannot be a subject for compromise. As
long as his majesty has announced that the homeland is forgiving and
merciful, it remains for them to study the best and most honorable way to
return to the homeland, since the Moroccan character of the Sahara has
become an irrevocable matter ... "
The meetings ended on July 19. Even if, perhaps, some psychological
barriers were broken, overall, the Al Ayoun talks accomplished nothing.
There was much bickering over protocol and other trivial issues. The main
problems were never addressed. As put by the Sahrawi Ambassador to
Algeria, Mohamed Lamine, "The only positive result is that we met,
officially. As for exploring the depths of the issue, that did not happen."2 4
The two positions were too far apart to be narrowed down in a few meetings.
Morocco sought-and still does seek-to absorb the Western Sahara through
a confirmatory referendum to be held whenever the Moroccans are sure of the
outcome or through POLISARIO's acceptance of the so-called regionalization
plan which amounts, in effect, to Moroccan annexation. For its part,
POLISARIO strives for independence and seeks negotiations in order to
convince Morocco that it would be granted all sorts of advantageous
cooperative agreements with an independent SADR: normal diplomatic
relations, security arrangements (non interference), economic cooperation at
all levels, and an adequate solution for Moroccan citizens remaining in the
SADR. °5
Even though the Al Ayoun meetings might have constituted a positive
step toward resolution of the conflict, the "tragicomedy" that took place in
New York in October 1993 proved how deceptive promises of negotiations
can be. Indeed, a high-level Sahrawi delegation went to New York to engage
in direct negotiations with a Moroccan negotiating team. Instead, they were
203. DelegationHead: SaharaIrrevocably Partof Country, F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., July 21, 1993,
at 19.
204. Ambassador on Results of Talks, F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., July 20, 1993, at 16.
205. D6claration du Front POLISARIO A la sdance de cl6ture des pourparlers d'EI-Aioun,
[POLISARIO Front Declaration at End of Al Ayoun Meeting] (July 19, 1993) (on file with
author).
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faced with Sahrawi defectors, despite the U.N. demand that the Moroccan
delegation be composed of government officials only. 20 6 Although some
members of the Security Council found Morocco's maneuver "provocative, 2 7 little was done to penalize such a violation. In defiance of the
world body, the Moroccan foreign minister reiterated the same statements that
have followed all such situations, i.e., that the meeting was simply a gathering
between Sahrawis which would allow them to envisage the future of the
Territory within the framework of Moroccan regionalization. 0 s
In January 1994, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought to encourage the holding
of direct negotiations. Both sides agreed, but the Moroccans chose as their
main negotiator General Abdelhak Kadiri, head of the Moroccan secret
services. POLISARIO, apparently, expressed some reservations with respect
to the choice, suggesting, instead, that the crown prince or the minister of
foreign affairs be the chief negotiator. The Sahrawis were also opposed to
including Sahrawi defectors as participants in the eventual negotiations.
Further, the two sides objected to the proposed sites: the Sahrawis wished,
and obtained the agreement of the French, that the negotiations be held in
Paris, whereas the Moroccans preferred Lisbon.
As was to be expected, these talks never materialized. In the meantime,
in which he basically
the Secretary-General submitted 2a 9report on March 10,
In its resolution,2 the Security Coun
reiterated his three propositions.
cil adopted Option (B) of the Secretary-General's report which calls for the
Meanwhile,
continuation of the work of the Identification Commission.'
the United Nations would continue its efforts to obtain the cooperation of
both parties on the basis of the compromise proposal of the Secretary-General.21 2 Undoubtedly, the Security Council rejected Options (A) and (C)
which would have been decidedly in favor of Morocco, for the first would
have permitted the U.N. to "proceed to hold the referendum regardless of the
cooperation of either party," i.e., without the POLISARIO, which is still
opposed to the criteria for eligibility imposed by the Moroccan side. 3 In
Option (C), the Secretary-General recommends that, should the U.N. fail to
obtain the cooperation of both parties in the completion of the registration

206.
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Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
207. Anthony Goodman, Morocco-PolisarioTalks on W.SaharaCollapse, REUTER LIBRARY
Rep., Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS,

News Library, ARCNWS file (quoting U.S.

Ambassador, Madeleine Albright).
208. Negotiations over Western Sahara Open in Stalemate, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct.

26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file.
209. The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara:Report by the Secretary-General,U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/283 (1994).
210. S.C. Res. 907, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/907 (1994).
211. Id. at 2.

212. Id.
213. The Situation Concerningthe Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General,U.N.
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and identification process, the Security Council might "decide either that the
whole MINURSO operation should be phased out ... or that the registration
and identification process should be suspended but that a reduced United
Nations military presence should be retained to encourage respect for the
cease-fire."214
In Fall 1995, the situation concerning Western Sahara continued to be
rather bleak. The specter of renewed military hostilities is still hanging over
the region. There were no signs that direct talks, let alone negotiations, were
about to take place. The United Nations has lost much of its credibility in
the eyes of the Sahrawis. The United Nations has failed to hold the
referendum for self-determination and to implement the peace plan it has
itself elaborated. Such a failure, coupled with the Sahrawi lack of confidence
in what is perceived as overt partiality of Boutros-Ghali in favor of Morocco,
led POLISARIO to contemplate the resumption of hostilities to break the
stalemate."
CONCLUSION

The absence of serious direct negotiations between Morocco and
POLISARIO, now at war for more than twenty years, has prevented the
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict through peaceful means. The
Sahrawis have been more open to the idea of direct talks, but Morocco has
always resisted, for various and obvious reasons. Even though the parties did
meet face to face, the Moroccan side never considered talks to be a viable
option. Morocco's opposition to genuine negotiations has been motivated by
several factors. Many considerations-political, economic, cultural, and
geopolitical-have prevented King Hassan, who has made the Western Sahara
a question of national resolve, from agreeing to enter into real negotiations.
In response to Saunders' question, "Why don't people negotiate?"2 6 the
answer, as applied to Morocco, is obviously very complex. Yet, a few
propositions can be advanced.
The two sides to this conflict have had a different definition of the
problem. Morocco has defined the problem as one of "national sovereignty,"
which consists of the "recovery of the lost territories," and a war against
"secessionists," sponsored by outside powers. The objective, from a
Moroccan point of view, is to maintain occupation, albeit illegal, of the
territory and to obtain recognition of its fait accompli by the international
community. All means must, therefore, be used to convince the "secessionists" to join the homeland. For POLISARIO, the Sahrawi question is one
of decolonization and of self-determination based on international legality.

214. Id. at 8.
215. See Polisario:Referendum in Dec. or 'Armed Battle,' F.B.I.S.-N.E.S., Aug. 25, 1995,
at 25-27.
216. Saunders, supra note 1, at 251.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1996

39

212

California
Western
International
Law Journal, Vol.
26,JOURNAL
No. 2 [1996], Art.
2 26
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
[Vol.

The ultimate objective is total independence of the disputed Territory. Thus,
there is total disagreement on the nature of the problem. The two sides could
not enter prenegotiation because they did not address the same issues.
From the inception of the conflict, except on a few occasions when he
thought he could negotiate a settlement with the Algerians to the exclusion
of the Sahrawis, King Hassan has consistently sought to prolong the status
quo, for it serves his interests much better. Regardless of what the outcome
of negotiations or a referendum might be, the King would face difficult
choices. Negotiating with the Sahrawis on concrete issues would be
interpreted as weakness of the monarchy and abandonment of a national
cause. Allowing a genuine referendum for self-determination to take place
would lead, whatever the results, to major difficulties. If he wins it, the King
will no longer be able to justify the domestic policies he has adopted since
the beginning of the dispute.2" 7 Further, he will no longer be able to keep
his untrustworthy military occupied and far from the palace.2"' Also, a
victorious referendum-without prior negotiations with POLISARIO-would
confront Moroccan society with rebellious Sahrawis. A defeat in the
referendum would have grave consequences for the monarchy because its
continued legitimacy might be jeopardized. This partly explains why the
King has used the stalemate to his own advantage by establishing an
irreversible presence in the "useful" part of the territory occupied by
Morocco. The huge investments and the settlement of Moroccan citizens in
the area have, from a Moroccan point of view, a permanent character.2 19
The support he obtained from the Western powers also encouraged the
King to pursue his tactics. During the Cold War, this support was quite
obvious even though it was clear that the Sahrawi issue never took on an
East-West dimension and that POLISARIO had no links with the Soviet
Union. 220 In the post Cold-War era, the U.S. position has become more
neutral; France and Spain have remained ambivalent, despite public
statements to the contrary. But, the lack of political will in bilateral relations
with Morocco and within the United Nations has done little to persuade King
Hassan to seek a negotiated settlement to the Western Sahara conflict. The
instability in Algeria has compelled Western powers not to act in a way that
may lead to the destabilization of Morocco.
The weakness of the United Nations, combined with a complaisant
attitude on the part of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative,
has been an additional factor in encouraging the King to cling to his

217. See
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supra note 5, at 293-304.

218. See generally Pranay Gupte, A Friend in Need, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1982, at
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219. Bookmiller, supra note 28, at 68; Conflict Impedes Maghrib Unity, supra note 28, at

28-29. See also Andrew Gowers, A Boomtown in the SaharaDunes, FIN. TIMES (London), July
13, 1987, at viii.
220. Yahia Zoubir, Moscow, the Maghreb, and Conflict in the Western Sahara, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 5, at 103-25.
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determined position not to negotiate with the Sahrawi nationalists.
The relative weakness of the Algerian regime, due to severe socioeconomic and political problems, has affected Moroccan (mis)perception of
the capacity of its neighbor to continue supporting POLISARIO and the
SADR. There is no doubt that Algeria's preoccupation with domestic
problems and the signs of divisions within its leadership concerning support
for the Sahrawi cause, combined with the factors listed above, have prompted
King Hassan to estimate "that the possible outcomes from negotiation are less
attractive than the alternatives to negotiation." 22 ' The dissension within
POLISARIO, due to the lack of progress toward a solution, has created a new
dimension in the King's calculations. Dissension coupled with the defections
of a few POLISARIO leaders222 has convinced the King that the best course
of action is to gain time and wait until POLISARIO has disintegrated.
Further, having used the cease-fire to strengthen his military position, the
King is assured of total military domination in the field should the war
resume.
There is another factor in explaining why the King is reluctant to
negotiate with POLISARIO leaders. Direct, genuine, negotiations with the
Sahrawis would result in the official recognition of the POLISARIO as a
legitimate interlocutor and representative of the Sahrawi people-even though
one might argue that there was a defacto recognition in the talks of January
1989-but it would also open the door to further state recognitions to add to
the more than seventy-five already obtained by the SADR.223 In addition,
direct negotiations with the Sahrawis would encourage opposition parties in
Morocco to also seek negotiations with the King in the hope of getting
concessions on domestic issues. Clearly, the refusal to negotiate with
POLISARIO fulfills a domestic function.
At the moment, it is doubtful whether the successful cases of negotiations
between the Israelis and the Palestinians or between the ANC and the white
minority in South Africa to achieve a peaceful resolution of protracted
conflicts will have any impact on Morocco. The Kingdom of Morocco seems
to be firmly clinging to its decision not to negotiate. The main objective at
the present time is to have the United Nations and the Western powers agree
to hold a referendum under Moroccan terms. In December 1995, this
scenario was close to materialization. The only question remains whether the
United Nations will allow yet another military confrontation to erupt in an
already volatile region.

221. Saunders, supra note 1,at 257.
222. See, e.g., Morocco to Speed up Voter Registration; Polisario Representative Defects,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS file.
223. South Africa is the latest country to have extended such a recognition having done so
in August 1995. See South Africa to Establish Diplomatic Ties with Western Sahara, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES file.
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